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JIHE MONETARY and economic unification of
the East and West German economy is a task
without precedent in peacetime economic histo-
ry. It not only merges two countries with strong-
ly divergent income and productivity levels, but
also unifies two economies with radically dif-
ferent economic structures—the German Demo-
cratic Republic’s (GDR) centrally planned econo-
my and the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG)
<‘social market economy.” Although conventional
wisdom calls for gradualism in the process of
monetary and economic unification of capitalist
economies and in the transition process from
socialism to a market economy, in the German
case, these tasks will be accomplished virtually
overnight.~
The legal basis for the unification process is
the treaty ratified by the East and West German
parliaments on June 21, 1990, which took effect
on July 1, 1990. The agreement outlines the
principles for monetary union, the economic
and social community of the two states and the
fiscal reform of East Germany.
The arrangements for monetary union, which
involved the replacement of the East German
“Mark” (M) by the West German “Deutsche
Mark” (DM), established the rates at which East
German financial stocks and flows would be
converted from their Mark values to D-Mark
values. A 1M:1DM rate was applied to East Ger-
man wages, salaries, rents, leases and pensions.
Savings accounts of GDR citizens were con-
verted at a IM:1DM rate up to a limit of M
4,000 (approximately $2,425 at the current
DM/$ exchange rate) for persons between 15
and 59 years of age. The corresponding limit
lAt the present time, discussion and analysis of the Gmu
has appeared primarily in German newspapers. I do not
quote these articles explicitly in the paper. Publications of
the Deutsche Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, of
Norbert Kloten, Karl Otto Poehi, Helmut Schlesinger and
Horst Siebert provided valuable insights and analysis. I
have profited from many discussions with Norbert Kloten
and members of the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and of the Volkswirtschaftliche
Abteilung der Landeszentralbank in Baden-Wuerttemberg.
2For the standard arguments, see Committee for the Study
of Economic and Monetary Union (1989), (“Delors Commit-
tee”). In the debate on economic transformation of
socialist countries see, for instance, Daviddi and Espa
(1989). There seems to be, however, a growing awareness
that partial reforms generate only limited success; see Roe
and Roy (1989).18
was M 6,000 for older persons and M 2,000 for
younger persons. A 2M:1DM rate was used to
convert all other financial assets and liabilities
of GDR residents. Mark assets held by individuals
who live outside the GDR were converted at a
3M:IDM rate.
The legal framework for the economic com-
munity between the two states and for the
transformation of East Germany’s economic
order involves nearly a complete adoption of
the FRG’s economic laws and regulations by
East Germany. These changes include the
restoration of private property and competition
in East Germany and the free movement of
goods, services, labor and capital between East
and West Germany. In addition, social welfare,
pensions, unemployment and health insurance
programs similar to those in West Germany
were introduced into East Germany; any deficits
in these new programs will be financed tem-
porarily by the FRG. Pensions in East Germany
were converted to DM values based on net East
German incomes; an East German worker can
i-eceive a maximum pension of 70 percent of his
or her net income after 45 years of employ-
ment. The agreement also guarantees that the
DM value of East German pensions cannot fall
below their former Mark equivalents.
Under the agreement, the East German
government will abolish its old system of high
tax levies on state enterprises and introduce, in-
stead, a system of income and value added taxes
consistent with those of West Germany. Future
debt issues by the GDR government must be
issued directly via the Deutsche Bundesbank or
with its approval. The FRG will finance two
thirds of the East German deficits from 1990
through 1994. For this purpose, a “German Uni-
ty” fund of DM 115 billion was launched; it will
be financed by a combination of bond issues
(DM 95 billion) and expenditure reductions in
the FRG central government budget (DM 20
billion).
3See the detailed report of the Institute for International
Finance (1990).
4oata for the GNP are not available.
“The lower figure is an estimate of the Kid Institute for
World Economics; the higher figure was estimated by the
five leading economic research institutes of the Federal
Republic in their report of April 12, 1990.
“At the present DM/Dollar exchange rate of about 1.65 DM
per Dol~ar,this equals $9,000 to $13,000. For comparison,
1989 per capita income in the United States was $21,000.
.1 .,, ~
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The paper starts with a short analysis of the
economic situation in East Germany after the
fall of the Wall. It tries to identify both the
goals of the East German people and those of
the West German government which together
have led to the present unification of both Ger-
manys. A brief outline of the reforms necessary
to transform the East German economy are
discussed first. The rest of the paper focuses on
monetary unification, certainly the most con-
troversial issue in the debate over unification.
East GIa’r Pp t canoms ~iitpI~
the •‘~ Fell
The deep economic malaise of the East Ger-
man economy provides a good example of the
general failure of the centrally planned
economic systems of Eastern Europe.3 Prior to
World War II, the part of Germany that now
makes up the GDR was essentially as developed
as those regions which now constitute the FRG.
Data for 1936, for example, show that per
capita income was 993 Reichsmark in the East
and 996 Reichsmark in the West.
Today, of course, it is not as easy to assess
the relative per capita incomes of the two Ger-
manys. The GDR’s administratively-set domestic
prices and exchange rates do not accurately
reflect its economic conditions; consequently,
“official” data, when available, must be treated
with skepticism. For example, the East German
Statistical Office recently published the first of-
ficial income estimate for East Germany; it
reported that GDP was M 353 billion for 1989.~
Most West German estimates of the GDR’s 1989
GNP range from M 230 billion to M 300 billion.”
If a 1M:IDM conversion rate is used with these
estimates, the GDR’s 1989 per capita income
was somewhere between DM 15,000 and DM
21,000,6 only about half of that estimated forTable I
Basic Data for East and West Germany (1988)
Unit East Germany West Germany
Area thousands of sq. miles 41,768 96,094
Population thousands 1667$ 61,715
Employment thousands 8,594 27 306
Agriculture’ % of total 11 5
Manufacturing1 % of total 47 40
Services’ % of total 25 36
Trade and transport’ % of total 18 19
GNP Mark/D-Mark billion (1989) 280-350 2,260
GNP per capita MarklD-Mark (1989) 17 000-21,000 38,600
Gross monthly salary Mark/D-Mark 1 250 3 192
Net monthly salary MarklD-Mark 1,050 2,153
Monthly social security
retirement benefits MarklD-Mark 450 1,597
Labor productivity as a percent of
West German labor product*vity 49 100
‘Data are for 1987.
SOURCES Officialstatistics ofthe GDRcompiled by the Deutsche Bundesbanic and Deutsches lnstitutfuerWirtschaftsforschung
the FRG (DM 36,600) in 1989 (table 1). Thus, of the disparity between the two Germanvs is
despite East Germany’s good educational system, shown by the relatively high proportion of total
its per capita income and, by proxy, its labor employment devoted to agriculture and
productivity, is estimated to be, at best, only manufacturing in the GDR (58 percent) com-
half that of West Germany.7 Of course, these pared to that in the FRG (45 percent); indeed,
comparative productivity figures are likely to the GDR’s cuirent proportion of employment in
prove misleading if used to predict what might agriculture and manufacturing is roughly iden-
occur after unification takes place; for example, tical to that which prevailed in the Federal
GDR products previously produced and sold Republic over 20 years ago.”
under a central plan designed to achieve autarkv -- - -
-- - In the past, the large difference in living stan-
may not be able to compete effectively with
- dards between the two German states could be goods that can now be imported from the West. -- - maintained only by the GDR’s actions to close
The economic disparity between the FRG and its borders with the West and prohibit virtually
the GDR is further demonstrated by the cx- all unauthorized movement of labor, capital,
tremely high environmental pollution in East goods and services between East and West Ger-
Germany, its obsolete infrastructure, outdated many. Since the border became permeable in
manufacturing planis and the generally poor autumn 1989, more than 2000 East German
quality of its housing stock. Another indication citizens have moved into West Germany daily;
‘The 50 percent estimate for the GDR’s relative labor pro- Kirner (1990)). However, the Kiel Institute for World
ductivity was made by the Deutsches Institut fuer Wirt- Economics estimates that GDR labor productivity is only
schaftsforschung, Berlin, in 1987 for the year 1983. It is about 35 percent of West German levels.
nearly identical to Collier’s (1985) estimate of 54 percent “See Gerstenberger (1990).
and to cross-country comparisons (see Cornelsen andas a result, between then and the first several
months of 1990, the GDR’s population decreased
by about 500,000 persons.
This massive exodus was possible only
because the West German constitution grants
citizenship status to all East Germans. Among
other things, this allowed East Germans who
moved to West Germany to obtain immediate
social benefits (unemployment benefits, retire-
ment insurance and aid to the disadvantaged)
that are tied to West German income levels.
FRG unemployment payments, for example, are
about 68 percent of West German net incomes;
in comparison, net incomes in the GDR are only
about one-third of that in the FRG.°The
substantial difference between West German
unemployment benefits and East German in-
come levels explains, in part, the massive migra-
tion of East German workers. However, these
specific incentives were eliminated on July 1,
1990, when the social community between both
states was established. From that date, all social
benefit payments to East Germans will be based
on East German income levels, not on those in
West Germany.
The migration of many skilled workers to the
FRG caused the economic situation in the GDR
to substantially deteriorate. Since November
1989, GDR industrial production and employ-
ment has decreased and most East German
enterprises have been unable to fulfill their pro-
duction plans. By the end of April 1990, in-
dustrial production was 4.5 percent below its
level one year before, and the number of
employed persons had fallen by 4.6 percent.
Shortages of goods and services produced grow-
ing social unrest in East Germany.
Given the circumstances described above, the
goals of the GDR population are quite evident:
They want to improve their relatively low stan-
dard of living as quickly as possible. Given the
disappointing economic results associated with
socialism, they were generally unwilling to ex-
periment with a system part-way between
socialism and capitalism. They chose, instead,
immediate and complete integration with the
Federal Republic of Germany even though they
knew that it would require total restructuring
of the East German economic and political
systems.
The extreme political uncertainty in the GDR
after the Wall fell, the obvious desire of the
East German population to unify both countries
and the massive outflow of East Germans into
West Germany, which aggravated housing pro-
blems in the FRG, left little room for political
maneuvering in West Germany and little time to
find a solution that would satisfy both East and
West Germans. Legally, of course, West Ger-
many could not oppose rapid unification; the
West German constitution (Article 23 of the
“Basic Law”) explicitly permits the East German
states to join the Federal Repubhc without re-
quiring the consent of either the West German
Government or its Parliament. This excluded a
variety of possible partial solutions and gradual
approaches.b0
Therefore, the main task facing West Ger-
many was to design a unification strategy that
would restore the confidence of East Germans
in the future prospects of East Germany and, at
the same time, be compatible with the chief in-
terests of West Germans. Consequently, the
debate in West Germany focused on the possi-
ble costs of the unification process. Among the
costs mentioned were:
1. The possible increase in the West German
inflation rate,
2. The prospects of either higher taxes or
higher interest rates (due to increased FRG
borrowing) resulting from increased FRG
expenditures for East Germany, and
3. The wealth transfer from West Germans to
East Germans associated with the replace-
ment of Mark-denominated savings and cur-
rency in the GDR by DM-denominated mon-
etary assets.
Once the actual conversion rates are chosen,
it is possible, albeit tentatively, to assess the im-
pact of monetary unification on matters that
concern the East and West Germans. The ten-
“Pensioners moving to West Germany received an average
pension of DM 1,121 (1988), more than twice the average
East German pension in Marks.
either flexible or fixed exchange rates between the two
currencies as an intermediate stage during the period of
economic transformation in the GDR.
101n fact, almost all West German economists as well as the
Bundesbank preferred a more gradual approach involvingtative nature of the assessment is chiefly due to
the absence of reliable data on the East German
economy and to the simultaneity of the
monetary and political integration with the
transformation of the East German economy.
The short-term focus of the analysis should not
lead to the impression that the risks and pro-
blems associated with unification of the two
Germanys are either substantial or pervasive.
The strong overall consensus in both German
states is that the long-term prospects of unifica-
tion are positive and that East Germany has the
potential to repeat the “economic miracle”
achieved by West Germany from the 1950s to
the present.”
Although this paper focuses primarily on
monetary unification, a brief discussion of the
economic reforms necessary in the real sector
of the GDR economy is needed. The Gmu itself
will not improve the economic situation in East
Germany substantially; it can provide, however,
a sound monetary framework for an overall
restructuring of the GDR’s economic and legal
system.
A cornerstone of real sector reform in the
GDR will be the introduction of free-market
pricing and production. Previously, most pro-
duction and prices had been set by government
agencies in accordance with their central plans.
One consequence of this system—as in many
other socialist countries—was that these prices
had been held essentially unchanged for years
despite changes in demand and cost condi-
tions.’~For example, the GDR’s official index for
consumer prices has shown virtually no move-
ment over the entire post-World War II era.
Moving to a market-based economy will re-
quire a number of changes. First, the current
pricing structure is distorted by large subsidies
for some industries, especially food and energy
(their subsidies totaled M5 0billion in 1988,
about one-third of total private expenditures in
the GDR) and heavy taxes on other industries,
primarily consumer durable goods (the tax total-
ed M 43 billion in 1988). These distorting in-
fluences on prices will have to be reduced.
Second, the central planning approach to pric-
ing and production must be replaced by the
usual market mechanisms that determine these
decisions in free-market economies. Not only
must prices be set by market conditions rather
than by government bureaucrats, but also the
extensive system of state-owned enterprises
must be privatized as well. In order for market
prices and wages to successfully provide the
signals for reallocating resources, the traditional
“soft budget constraint” of state-owned enter-
prises has to be replaced by the “hard budget
constraint” of profits, losses and, if necessary,
strict bankruptcy laws.”’
Third, the “Kombinate,” which are con-
glomerates of GDR firms that produce similar
products, have created an extremely high
degree of horizontal concentration in the GDR
economy; this has contributed to the GDR price
inflexibility discussed previously. Consequently,
price reform requires that these “Kombinate” be
dismantled as soon as possible. However, even if
this is not immediately forthcoming, the in-
troduction of the freely convertible D-Mark will
create a more competitive environment because
it will significantly open up the GDR’s economic
relations with West Germany and the rest of
the world.
Thus, while there are many open questions
concerning specific details of how the divergent
legal systems will be reconciled and how
privatization will be achieved, there is wide ac-
ceptance that these are the central elements of
real sector reform and that they will take
place.14
As noted previously, the major controversy
over unification focused on monetary
unification—that is, how to determine the rates
at which GDR financial stocks and flows
denominated in Marks would be converted into
their appropriate D-Mark values. The main
reason for the intensive debate was that none
11See lnstitut der deutschen Wirtschaft (1990).
“’See the survey conducted by Commander and Coricelli
(1990).
“See Sokil and King (1989).
“See e.g. “Reform’ (1990).of the existing exchange rates between the
Mark and the D-Mark seemed relevant for
determining the n-Mark value of GDR financial
stocks and flows after unification. In this
respect, the Gmu is quite different from the for-
mation of a monetary union between two or
more market economies. For instance, the ap-
propriate conversion rate was easily determined
when Saarland, which had become independent
from Germany after the World War II, was
unified with the FRG in 1959. In this instance,
Saarland’s financial flows and stocks, which had
been denominated in French Francs prior to
unification, were simply converted to their DM
values at the prevailing market exchange rate
between the Franc and the n-Mark.
In the case of Gmu, however, all existing ex-
change rates were either highly distorted or
essentially devoid of economic significance. The
same criticism applies to the macroeconomic
data that might otherwise have been used to
calculate an “equilibrium exchange rate” on the
basis of the traditional exchange rate models.”
After the fall of the Wall, the one market ex-
change rate between Mark and n-Mark was the
DM price for Mark bank notes that had been il-
legally “exported” from the GDR to West Ger-
many. However, this rate, which is shown in
figure 1, is not representative of the underlying
fundamental relative price of Marks in terms of
nMs for several reasons. First, it was subject to
speculative influences which made it very
volatile,” Second, it reflected demands by East
Germans for certain goods (e.g., consumer elec-
tronics and coffee) that were highly taxed in the
GnR; table 2 shows that the Mark prices of these
products in the GDR were about five times
higher than their n-Mark prices in West Ger-
many. Third, the arbitrage (flow) of subsidized
East German products to the West has remained
relatively weak due to transaction costs and
trade restrictions.
Another possible candidate for the “true ex-
change rate” to use for conversion purposes
might have been the so-called “nevisenren-
tabilitaet” (foreign exchange profitability) of GDR
exports in terms of their nM equivalent. This
rate is calculated by dividing the Mark value of
the aggregate GDR exports by their nM revenue
when they are sold to West Germany. In 1989,
this ratio, which was used by the GDR govern-
ment for all internal conversion calculations,
was 4.4 Marks per UM, Again, however, this
ratio does not indicate what the market ex-
change rate would be. First, the domestic prices
of many G]JR export products were artificially
high due to taxes imposed by the GIJR; conse-
quently, the numerator of the ratio is heavily
influenced by tax policy, not economic values.
Second, export decisions were made by the GDR
government primarily to obtain foreign ex-
change to finance its imports. It is evident that
this non-market allocation process, which is
typical of centrally planned economies,” is not
representative of market-based trade; among
other consequences, it can lead to exports with
very low profitability.”
A third alternative is the official 1M:1DM ex-
change rate set in the past by the East German
Government.’9 Like all such official exchange
rates established in socialist countries, this was
an arbitrary rate used primarily as an accoun-
ting unit which embodies no useful economic
information relevant to determining the rate to
use for Gmu conversion purposes.’°All foreign
exchange transactions were conducted at flexi-
ble (implicit) exchange rates which were the
ratios of the internal Mark price to the world
market nM price of each product.”
“’See Frenkel and Goldstein (1986), Williamson and Miller
(1987).
“’II varied from 16:1 (November 17, 1989) to 3:1 after the
definitive conversion rate for non-GDR residents had
become public.
“See Wolf (1985b, pp. 215).
“’See Cornelsen and Kirner (1990).
“’Until 1989, this rate was also used for the “forced ex-
change” (“Zwangsumtausch”) of DM 25 for West Ger-
mans who wanted to visit East Germany. From the begin-
ning of 1990, West German travelers could exchange D-
Marks at a 1:3 rate against Marks.
2cThe same criticism applies to the exchange rates agreed
to by the East and West German governments in
December 1989 when they established a fund to exchange
bank notes for travel: Each East German citizen was entitl-
ed to purchase up to 100 DM at a 1DM:1M rate and an

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consumer Prices of Selected Goods and Services in the GDR
and the Federal Republic of Germany (1985)
Price in Price in M price as a percent
Goad/Service (M) GDR (DM) FRG of the DM price
Potatoes (5 kg) M4.05 DM5 32 76
Tomatoes (1 kg) 4.40 2.10 210
Rye Bread (1.5 kg) 0.93 4.54 21
Beef (1kg) 980 19.45 50
Chocolate (100 g) 385 0.89 433
Coffee (250 g) 25.00 5.25 476
Jeans (men’s) 135.00 59.90 225
Brown Coal (50 kg) 3.51 19.40 18
Radio/Cassette Recorder 1.16000 199.95 550
Color TV 5,650.00 119900 471
Rent (1 bedroom) 75.00 390.00 19
Electricity (75 kwh) 75 0 29.30 26
Haircut (man) 1.90 1125 17
Railway Ticket (50 km) 4.00 92 0 4 3
SOURCE: Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation, 1987, pp. 513. 516. 732-735
for example, rely on the “law of one price”
holding in integrated and competitive markets.””
The relative version of PH’, developed by
Gustav Cassel to determine equilibrium ex-
change rates after World War 1,24 relates the re-
quired exchange rate adjustment between the
currencies of two countries with different infla-
tion rates. However, this procedure requires the
existence of an unbiased base period in the
past, a condition which clearly is not met in the
GDR setting.
The absolute version of PPP avoids the base
period problem by defining an equilibrium ex-
change rate as the ratio of the price of a stan-
dard market basket of goods in one currency to
the price of the same basket in another curren-
cy. Thus, the consumption basket of an average
GDR household could provide one basis for ab-
solute PPP calculations of an appropriate
Mark/n-Mark exchange rate. In 1985, for exam-
ple, the goods and services which made up this
basket (excluding rents) had a DM equivalent
value which was 10 percent higher than their
Mark price.”” If we assume that the GDR price
level has remained unchanged while the market
basket’s nM equivalent value has risen at the in-
flation rate in West Germany since 1985, the
price differential would be about 15 percent in
1989. Thus, an absolute PPP exchange rate based
on consumer prices (for a given market basket
of goods and services) would be 1.1SDM:1M or
a lnM:O.9M conversion rate. However, due to
high subsidies and the existence of a “monetary
overhang” (explained later in the paper), in-
dicative of an excess demand for goods in the
GnR, the economic relevance of such calcula-
tions is severely limited.””
Because most structural exchange rate models
(e.g., those based either on the monetary ap-
proach with fixed or flexible prices or on the
portfolio balance approach) require either short-
term or long-term PH’ to hold, they are beset
with the same conceptual drawbacks as the sim-
ple PPP calculations already discussed. In addi-
tion, they presume that people are able to
engage in unlimited arbitrage between financial
““See Cassel (1918, p. 413): “As long as anything like free
movement of merchandise and a somewhat comprehen-
sive trade between the two countries takes piace, the ac-
tual rate of exchange cannot deviate very much from this
purchasing power parity.”
“4See Dornbusch (1987).
“Including rents the difference was 25 percent.
““An alternative PPP measure, the ‘Devisenrentabilitaet,”
yields an equilibrium exchange rate of 1 DM:4.4M.
However, the problems of this specific measure have
already been discussed.markets in the respective countries; this condi-
tion did not exist in the GDR prior to the Gmu.”7
A
~/ A’A’A~’A
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In order to clarify the issues associated with
the Gmu, this section presents a brief discussion
of the main items whose values were converted
from Marks to DMs in the process of monetary
unification. Throughout the paper, a distinction
will be made between financial stocks and
financialflows.
~ sit flue ‘A
~ A:,? A:’,,r A’AAA
The stock of financial assets in the GDR is
represented by the consolidated balance sheet
of its banking system presented in table 3. In
contrast to how these accounts would be drawn
up in the United States, the loans and liabilities
of the central bank (“Staatsbank”) must be add-
ed to the state-owned commercial banks on a
consolidated basis. As is typical in most central-
ly planned economies, the GDR did not permit
direct financial transactions between enterprises
and households e’dichotomized money sup-
ply”)-”8 Therefore, this consolidated balance
sheet presents a comprehensive picture of the
stock of all financial assets and liabilities in East
Germany.
The principal items on the asset side of the
banking system were loans to state-owned
enterprises, housing (chiefly state-owned), direct
credits to the government, and claims on for-
eigners. Loans to households were negligible,
making up less than 1 percent of all bank assets.
In contrast, such loans represent about 23 per-
cent of bank assets in the Federal Republic.
Savings of private households are the most
important liability of the GUR’s banking system.
The consolidated balance sheet prioo to the
Gmu also shows a considerable amount of
foreign liabilities. However, the bulk of these
foreign liabilities (M 96 billion) was simply an
accounting item e’Bichtungskoeffhdent’i arising
from the GDIVs practice of valuing its foreign
assets and liabilities at a 1DM:4.4M exchange
rate rather than at its “official” IDM:1M ex-
change rate. After Gmu, of course, the DM
denominated foreign debt of the Grill will be
valued at its face value. The revaluation of
foreign assets and liabilities also reduced the
amount of external claims (from M4 5billion to
DM 36 billion) and the debt of the government
(from M 61 billion to DM 12 billion).
After revaluation of foreign assets and liabili-
ties and the overall 1DM:2M conversion of all
domestic items, except for the limited 1DM:1M
conversion of savings, the liabilities of the GDR
banking system (1DM 246 billion) exceeded its
assets (1DM 220 billion) by DM 26 billion. This
difference was created by the asymmetric con-
version of the left and the right side of the con-
solidated balance sheet produced by an effective
1DM:t4M conversion rate of total savings. To
equilibrate their balance sheets, East German
banks were given interest-bearing government
assets from an equalization fund established by
the GIJR for this purpose. Except for this fund,
the post-Gmu balance sheet shows that the net
bank debt of the actual GDR government sector
is relatively small (DM 7 billion).
The 1DM:1M conversion rate for financial
flows determined the n-Mark equivalent for
Mark-denominated wage and rent contracts in
existence prior to July 2, 1990. Although these
contracts can (and undoubtedly, will) be renego-
tiated after this date, a legal transformation of
existing contractual obligations from their pre-
vious Mark payments into 1DM payments (“re-
kurrenter Anschluss”) was required”” For all
new contracts and those old contracts for which
payments could be adjusted immediately or on
short notice, the conversion rate was irrelevant.
GUR pensions were treated somewhat differ-
2OThis also excludes the application of the “underlying
balance approach to exchange rate assessment,” which
was developed by the lnternationai Monetary Fund. Accor-
ding to Williamson and Mifler (1987, p. iO~, who have
elaborated this method, the “fundamental equilibrium ex-
change rate” is defined as the rate “which is expected to
generate a current account surplus or deficit equal to the
underlying capital flow over the cycle, given that the coun-
try is pursuing ‘internal balance’ as best as it can and not
restricting trade fcr balance of payments reasons.”
““See Wolf (1985a).
“Poole (1990) emphasizes, on purely economic grounds.
that “any attempt to convert prices of goods and services
from CM (Ostmarit to DM through central direction can
only cause great difficulty.”Table 3
consoudated Ba~ance Sheet of the Banking System Gf the GOR as of May 31, 1990
M Conver- DM Wi ~enver- DM
Assets blilien sion rate billion Liabilities billion sion rate biii~on
1. Lending to domestic 1. Oepc~~ts 1rom domestic
borrowers non-banks
lotal 3.974 -- 18D 7 rota: 249.9 ..~
Go’,errrnent 603 2’ 123 Government 108 21 4
o wh’cn
Lenc.~g:n oar neston
wi9-:hc- ‘e’,’aiLat on o’
e~teri’.alliah~tios 3! 2 -— —
clams on tr,e governmart
from ihe in’t1al proision
of notes ano coins ii 1948 4.9 ——
Enterprises 231 7 21 115 8 Enterprises 57.0 2.051 27.8
Hous’ng sector 102.6 21 51.3
lid viduats excluding




Res,oents 165.6 1 44:1’ 115.2
Non-’esidents 23 2 05-1’ 11
Life :nswance 142 2:1 7.1
2. External claims 450 —- 363 2. External liabilities 152.5 — 556
~a)cMEA countries 174 -— 87 (a) ~MEAcountries 1.1 -—- 0.6
lo) Western ;ndustrial and ~ Western indust’ial and
deveiopir.g countries 275 - 27.6 developing countries 55.0 550
~clProvisons for external
liabilities ç’Ricntungskoef.
fizenten”j 96.4 ‘ —
3. Participations I 1 1.1 1.1 3. Currency in circLilation
~excIuding the banks’ casn
holdings~ 13.6 2:1 6.8
4. Accumulated profits/
reserve funds/guarantee
funds 234 1.1 23.4
4. Other assets 31 2’1 15 5. Other liabilities 7.2 21 3.6
Total 4466 — 219.6 Tcta 4466 -- 2460
Balancing item —— 26.4 Balancing item - -- -—
Tctai 4466 1.81:1 246.0 Total 4466 1 81 1 2460
hose at actually l.ab,l~Iiesor ‘he ban-cing sectorto tne governrr-enl. whch migrt cisc be snown in ‘.ao.iitres .tem 1. In
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adjusted the GDR pension system to make it
consistent with West German standards; among
other things, this meant that the DM value of
GDR pensions was not less than their previous
Mark value.
For West Germans, who traditionally have
placed a very high social value on price stabili-
ty, concern over the imphcations of the Gmu on
the inflation rate played a predominant role in
the choice of the conversion rate. The existence
of an excess supply of money, which, by
Walras’ Law, reflects rationing on goods and
labor markets,~° is a widely acknowledged oc-
currence for centrally planned economies, in-
cluding the GDR.33 Many observers expected
that a flat IM:1DM conversion of the East Ger-
man money stock would produce a rise in the
price level and, hence, a transitory increase in
the measured rate of inflation for the integrated
German currency area after the Gmu.
The expected impact of monetary unification
on the German inflation rate can be determined
as follows: First, estimate a hypothetical G]JR
money stock that would be compatible with
stable IJM prices in the Gflfl; second, compare
this hypothetical money stock with the actual
DM money stock of the GDR after conversion.
If the actual money stock exceeds the hypotheti-
cal one, the conversion could produce a tem-
porary increase in inflation in both Germanys;
otherwise, the conversion does not have infla-
tionary implications.
To accomplish the first step requires
calculating the East German money demand
after the Gmu. To do this, of course, one has to
estimate the velocity of money and potential
nominal production of the GDH economy. The
following estimates are based on the assumption
that both relative and absolute DM prices in the
GDR as well as the GDR’s velocity of money will
be identical to their West German counterparts
after unification. GULl potential production can
be estimated either by using its GNP, which is
about 13 percent of West Germany’s GNP, or
some measure of potential output determined
by relative labor productivity estimates. This lat-
ter method32 uses the proportion of the East
Germany population to West German population
(about 26 percent) and the estimated average
GULl labor productivity relative to that in West
Germany (about 50 percent) to obtain a relative
GULl potential production of about 13 percent,
which is identical to the relative GNP differen
tial noted above. Use of a lower estimate of the
GUR productivity differential, for instance, the
30 percent estimate of the Kid Institute for
World Economics, reduces the GDR’s potential
production to only about 10 percent of that in
the FRG.
This approach can be used to determine the
“non-inflationary” conversion rates for different
monetary aggregates; various estimates are
shown in table 4. Applying the West German
ratio between potential output to the stock of
currency yields a conversion rate of about
1M:IDM for East German currency holdings. To
calculate a non-inflationary Mi money measure
for the GULl requires determining the ‘mo-
neyness” of the various GUR deposit categories.
If the “Spargiro” (M 69.0 billion) and deposits of
enterprises are essentially demand deposits and
the “Buchsparen” (M 90.7 billion) are essentially
the same as traditional savings deposits included
in M3, the pre-Gmu GUR Mi money stock was
about one-third of that in West Germany. Thus,
the non-inflationary conversion rate for the
GUll’s Ml money stock would lie in the
1UM:2.4M to 1UM:3.3M range. Using the M3
money stock, the non-inflationary conversion
rate would he within 1UM:1.5M and 1DM:2M.33
Comparing East and West German money
stock measures is always problematical because
there is a much wider spectrum of financial op-
portunities available to West German investors.
Their savings in long-term time and savings
deposits, bank savings bonds and other financial
instruments issued by banks, which are called
“monetary capital” and not included in M3, are
larger than the NI3 money stock. Adding these
financial assets to the West German M3 money
stock yields a liquidity stock measure (L).
30See Commander and Coricelti (1990), p. 3.
31See Sokil and King (1989).
33ln West Germany, the money stock MS includes currency
in circulation (excluding banks’ cash balances), sight
deposits, time deposits with a maturity of less than four
years and savings deposits at statutory notice.
~lt which was suggested by the President of the Kiel In-
stitute for World Economics, Horst Siebert.Table 4
Conversion Rates on the Basis of a Non-Inflationary Money Stock
for the GDR (1989)
Non-inflationary
Actual values values for the GDR Conversion rates
GDR’ FRG A2 AB
(M billion) (OM billion) (DM billion)
Currency 17.0 1469 19.1 14.7 1 09 11.2
Ml’ 146.6 450.6 599 45.1 1:2.4 4,33
M3~ 252.0 1255.5 1670 125.6 1 1.5 1’2.0
LB 2520 2738.3 3642 273.8 1:0.7 1 07
Vaiues for the GDA include deposits of enterprises and housenolds with the banking system.
2Ass-urnng that GDR potential output is 133 percent of FAG potential output.
3Assuming that GOP pot~ntiatoutput is 10 percent of FAG potential output.
~currencyin circulation and domestic non-banks’ sight deposits
5M1 plus domestic non-banks’ t:me depostts and funds borrowed for less than 4 years pUs
savings deposts at statutory notice
~M3olus savrng deposits at agreed notice, long-tern, time deposits, bank savings bonds and
other financial instruments held by private nouseholds and enterprises with banks.
SOURCE: Oeutsche Bundesbank. Monatsberichte. Jahresbericht l989 der Staatsbank der OOR.
In contrast, savings deposits and currency are
the only financial stores of value available in
East Germany.34 Thus, for East Germany, L and
M3 are identical. Using the L measure, the non-
inflationary conversion rate would be about
1UM:1M. However, in order to make the con-
verted East German L measure truly com-
parable to the West German L, about 50 per-
cent of East German savings would have to be
“frozen” for about four years.
As table 4 shows, an assessment of the infla-
tionary impact associated with the Gmu depends
on which monetary aggregate is regarded as the
one linked most closely to inflation. Most
econometric estimates for the Federal Republic
show a very stable relationship between the
money stock, M3, and inflation (and nominal
GNP); this is the reason why the Bundesbank
uses M3 as its main inflation indicator and as its
central intermediate monetary policy target.35
Taking M3 as the benchmark money stock for
non-inflationary purposes suggests that the con-
version rate for the GULl money stock shou.ld lie
in a range between 1UM:i.5M to 1UM:2M.
While the latter value was recommended by the
Bundesbank, the political compromise reached
between the two governments led to an average
conversion rate of about 1UM:l.7M. While the
estimated non-inflationary conversion rates
shown in table 4 are subject to considerable
uncertainty, the final conversion program
chosen for the Gmu seems unlikely to produce
any substantial inflationary impact on prices in
the new DM currency area.
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The non-inflationary conversion calculations
described above assumed that the velocity of
the appropriate money stock in the GULl is iden-
tical to that in the FRG. Some observers in the
Federal Republic have argued that countries
with higher per capita income levels have dif-
ferent monetary velocities from those in less-
developed countries. Figures 2 and 3 show the
results of a cross-country analysis comparing
~4This aspect was emphasized by the East German Central
Bank (“Staatsbank”) in an official statement of April 3,
1990
355ee Deutsche Bundesbank (WS9a), Schlesinger and
Jahnke (1987).Figure 2











per capita nominal incomes and velocities for
the Ml and M3 money stocks in OECU coun-
tries in 1987. The figures indicate that per capi-
ta income has no significant influence on the
velocity of money. However, the marked inter-
country differences in the velocity of money
serves as yet another reminder that the non-
inflationary GULl money stock calculations are
subject to considerable uncertainty.
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The potential impacts of the Gmu on the
unemployment rate in the GUR and its
economic growth prospects were another im-
portant determinant of the conversion rate.
While West Germans were concerned about the
possible fiscal costs of unemployment payments
to East Germans, the East Germans, as noted
earlier, were primarily interested in the pro-
spects for employment and for raising their
standard of ilving as quickly as possible. These
prospects depend fundamentally on how com-
petitive the GUll firms will be after the central
planning process is dismantled and the economy
of the GUll is opened up to world markets.
While it is evident that the conversion of enter-
prise debt has a direct impact on the financial
structure and capital costs of firms in East Ger-
many, the implications of the conversion rate
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The 1UM:ZM conversion rate for financial
stocks determines the debt burden and interest
payments of enterprises after the unification
process.38 It has important consequences for the
costs of capital and for the projected privatiza-
tion of East German firms. The latter, an essen-
tial element of the process of economic
transformation, requires that the firms to be
privatized must have a positive net worth. For
enterprises that will remain under state owner-
ship, the ratio of their UM equity to their total
UM assets after conversion will play a key role
in determining whether they can survive with a
“hard budget constraint,” i.e. without subsidies
from the government.
Because there is no data on the debt-equity
ratios of East German enterprises, it is difficult
to assess the implications of the llJM:2M con-
version rate on their financial situation and on
their interest payments. To get a rough estimate
of the sustainability of alternative debt burdens,
however, the proportion of GUR potential out-
put to ERG potential output can be used; as
already mentioned, estimates vary between 10
38Again, the conversion rates which were put forward in the
debate varied widely, ranging from a 100 percent debt
economic research institutes in their report of April 12,
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relief which was recommended by the five leading German Bundesbank, to a full 1:1 conversion.and 13 percent. According to Bundesbank (1989)
statistics, the net financial debt of West German
enterprises (excluding housing and the financial
sector) was UM 681.5 billion and the book value
of their non-financial assets totaled UM 10965
billion in 1988. The ERG figures indicate that a
1UM:IM conversion for the debt of GULl enter-
prises would have produced a relatively large
UM 175 bfflion net debt (see table 3), about 26
percent of the West German leveL” If East Ger-
man firms’ nonfinancial assets are worth about
10 to 13 percent38 of that for West German
firms, the right side of their balance sheets
would have exceeded the left side (UM 110-140
biffion) by huge amounts, even if West German
firms’ balance sheets contain extensive hidden
reserves. Without further debt reduction,
privatization of virtually all East German firms
would have been impossible. According to West
German bankruptcy law, which requires
bankruptcy proceedings if a firm has negative
net worth, most East German firms would have
had to be declared bankrupt.
Of course, an outright cancellation of all GUll
enterprise debt would have avoided these pro-
blems. However, this “solution” was dismissed
for two reasons: First, firms with permanent
net debt levels are common in all industrialized
countries; second, it would have led to a huge
increase in the government debt as described
later in this paper. The debt reduction~° achiev-
ed by the 1UM:2M conversion rate places the
average ratio of equity to assets for GUR enter-
prises in a range between 20 and 37 percent,
which should allow the privatization of at least
some firms. By comparison, the average equity
to asset ratio is about 20 percent in West Ger-
many and 50 percent in the United States.’°
Because the results are quite sensitive to the
estimate of the value of real assets in the GULl,
it is difficult to assess whether the interest
burden of East German firms will be similar to
the West German enterprise sector or whether
it will be significantly higher. In addition, it is
not yet clear whether East German firms will
have to pay market-determined interest rates on
their debt after monetary unification.
The second determinant of East German
firms’ post-conversion competitiveness are the
UM wages they will have to pay. While neither
the GULl nor the FRG government should deter-
mine wages after the transition to a market
economy, their treaty established a wage con-
version rate to define the financial obligations
of existing contracts for the time immediately
after July 2, 1990. However, the actual conver-
sion rate chosen has implications for wage
levels and competitiveness only if nominal UM
wages in the GULl after conversion are inflexible
downward and if initial UM wages are set “too
high” compared with labor productivity.
These considerations would have called for a
conversion rate that reduced average wages
below the level indicated by the GDR’s average
productivity. The advantage of this low starting
level for wages is that it would have allowed
workers and firms in East Germany to
renegotiate their contracts more easily after
Gmu. This would have enabled them to
establish a wage structure more closely mat-
ching sectoral productivity differentials than the
prior GUR wage structure, in which wages
were relatively uniform regardless of productivi-
ty differences.
To evaluate the competitiveness of East Ger-
man firms after a 1UM:1M wage conversion,
their labor productivity relative to that in com-
parable West German firms must be compared
with their relative UM wages. These com-
parisons would require information on the pro-
ductivity of individual firms or, at least, in-
dividual sectors in the GULl after July 2, 1990.
Unfortunately, such sectoral data are not
available at all; moreover, estimates of labor
productivity in the GUR aftef- the transition to a
market economy are very difficult to determine
ex ante. However, the experience following the
West German currency reform in June 1948
shows that large productivity gains can be
achieved rather quickly; these gains arise from
better incentives associated with the market
process and increased availability of inputs. In
37A high debt burden is regarded as a typical concomitant of
the central planning mechanism, which gives enterprises
automatic bank credits inducing large hoardings of inven-
tories or camouflaging cost overruns, waste and sales in
the black market (Grossman 1989, p. 31).
capital as in West Germany, Alexander and Gagnon (1990)
estimate the level of the East German capital stock to be
10,4 percent of the West German capital stock.
~ strategy of recapitalization is now also suggested for
other Eastern European countries, See Hinds (1990,p. 44).
45See Bank for lnternational Settlements (1989, p. 86). ~On the basis of a Cobb-Douglas production function and
assuming an identical elasticity of output with respect tothe GULl, where such incentives are lacking,
shortages of specific inputs are often reported
to have led to significant decreases in output
and productivity.’
On the other hand, the far-reaching restruc-
turing of production processes will not be possi-
ble without some temporary output disrup-
tions.~~ If these positive and negative effects
roughly cancel each other in the first few
months after conversion, the GUll’s productivity
should reach about 50 percent of that in West
Germany, which is consistent with past
estimates made by the Ueutsches lnstitut fuer
Wirtschaftsforschung.
Before the conversion took place, the average
monthly salary of a worker was M 1250 in the
GUR and UM 3192 in West Germany. With the
1UM:1M conversion of the initial nominal
wages, monthly wage costs (including
employers’ contributions to social security) for
East German firms would be about 37 percent
of West German wages.43 Thus, the average DM
wage level in the GUR after the conversion is
not so high relative to the average productivity
differential between GUll and ERG workers that
it would preclude future wage negotiations.
However, the initial wage differential cannot
be held constant by the government after the
Gmu. Therefore, the medium-term outlook for
employment as well as for foreign and West
German investment in the GUR will depend
mainly on the rate of subsequent wage in-
creases in the GUll. If these exceed the growth
of productivity in the GUll, employment and in-
vestment in GUll firms will fall.
Because the unification process has been
driven primarily by the desire of East Germans
to improve their standard of living, the effects
of monetary unification on the FRG-GDR real in-
come differential were intensively discussed in
both East and West Germany. However, since
wages will be renegotiated after the Gmu,
monetary unification will have only a short-term
impact after July 2, 1990.
An estimate of the change in East German
real incomes resulting from the Gmu can be
calculated by assuming that nominal wages in
the GUll will remain constant after conversion
and after the various subsidies are abolished.
The basis for comparing pre- and post-Gmu real
incomes in the GUll is the consumption basket
of an average GUR household that was discuss-
ed earlier.
The abolition of trade restrictions and
product-specific taxes and subsidies will produce
price structures and a price level in East Ger-
many similar to that in West Germany. Thus,
the Gmu will cause a “one-shot” consumer price
increase of about 15 percent for the unchanged
GUll consumer goods basket.” In addition, the
increase in social security contributions, due to
the introduction of the West German social
security system into East Germany, will reduce
the average net monthly income of an East Ger-
man worker from M 1050 to UM 983 after
unification. Together with the one-shot price ad-
justment in consumer goods, real incomes in
the GUR will be reduced by about 21 percent.45
41According to a survey of the lnstitut der deutschen Wirt-
schaft, about one lhird of all GDR employees had to sus-
pend their work for two or more hours per day because of
shortages and defective machines.
~ln the past, all decisions on investment, production and
sales were made by the central planning bureaucrats;
managers of firms were mainly responsible for technical
operationt
43The 1DM:2M conversion rate proposed by the Deutsche
Bundesbank differs less from the 1DM:IM rate chosen
than one might assume at first glance. In its calculations,
the Bundesbank assumed that all subsidies would be
removed before conversion, requiring an increase in Mark
wages of about 25 to 30 percent to compensate for this ef-
fect. If these new Mark wages were then converted at a
1 DM:2M rate, the effective conversion rate between initial
East German Markwages and DM wages after the Gmu
would have been about 1DM:1.2M. Including the
employer’s contribution to social security, the initial labor
costs in the GOP would have been about one third of the
West German level if the 1DM:2M conversion rate had
been used.
UThis change from Mark prices to 0-Mark prices has no ef-
fect on the overall German inflation rate which is measured
on the basis of the DM equivalent of goods and services.
~These orders of magnitude show that conversion rates for
GOP incomes considerablyabove 1DM:1M, for instance,
IDM:2M or IDM:3M, would have strongly increased the
movement of workers from East to West Germany. Assum-
ing constant consumption patterns, a 1DM:2M (1DM:3M)
rate would have reduced GDR real incomes by 57 percent
(70 percent) compared to their pre-Gmu levels.The above calculations overstate somewhat
the negative welfare implications of unification.
Households will adjust to the price changes by
purchasing more of the goods with relatively
cheaper UM prices and less of those whose
prices rose more because they had been heavily
subsidized in the past. The prospective adjust-
ment of the previous Mark price structure to
the UM price structure is indicated in table 2.
As no detailed data on consumption patterns of
East Germans are available, the quantitative
relevance of this substitution effect is difficult
to evaluate.” The same comment applies to the
positive welfare effects attributed to prospective
quality improvements in available consumer
goods; after the Gmu, East Germans will be able
to buy West German products which, on
average, are of better quality than their East
German counterparts.
On balance, the real income of East Germans
and the real income differential between East
and West Germany will remain essentially un-
changed immediately after the Gmu, with real
net incomes in the East about 50 percent lower
than in the West. This result reflects the fact
that monetary unification by itself can only
create a framework for real sector reform.
Significant improvements in East German living
standards will only be generated by better
allocation of their resources and increased in-
vestment. Thus, the incentive for East German
workers, especially skilled workers, to move to
the Federal Republic of Germany remains at
least as strong as it was before the Gmu.
However, the prospect of a rapid and wide-
ranging restructuring of the GUR economy has
already improved the motivation of East Ger-
mans to remain in the GUll and contribute to
its economic recovery. The number of GUR
citizens moving to the FRG, which reached a
monthly peak of 133,000 in November 1989, fell
to only 19,000 by May 1990.
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The Gmu will result in a wealth transfer from
West Germany to East Germany.~~ The
mechanisms and the quantitative effects of this
wealth transfer, however, remain uncertain.
To examine this issue, even if a definitive
answer is not forthcoming, it is useful to start
with an example of a hypothetical currency
unification between two market economies, e.g.,
between France and West Germany. Suppose
that the UM is to be replaced by the Franc and
that the current market exchange rate
(1UM= 3FF) will be used to convert all UM
financial and real stocks and flows in their
Franc equivalent. In this case, there is no
transfer of real wealth; simply multiplying all U-
Mark prices by three does not reallocate wealth
within Germany nor between France and the
Federal Republic.48 Redistribution of wealth bet-
ween creditors and debtors in both countries
could occur only if that currency unification
leads to unexpected changes in inflation and if
some debtors or creditors had been expecting a
parity adjustment. In this case, the net transfer
between the two countries would then be deter-
mined by creditor/debtor relations between
France and Germany and by the direction of
the change in expectations.
In the Gmu case, there is no wealth transfer
between GUR residents and West Germans due
to unexpected exchange rate variations because
there were virtually no financial linkages bet-
ween individuals or enterprises in both coun-
tries prior to the Gmu. The asymmetric conver-
sion of assets and liabilities, however, transfers
GUll debt to the FRG (see shaded insert). Before
the Gmu, the aggregate wealth of the East Ger-
man economy consisted of its aggregate real
assets and its aggregate net foreign claims
(debts); domestic financial claims and liabilities
simply cancel out in the aggregation process.
Because monetary unification has no implica-
tions for the GUll’s foreign claims and liabilities,
it can increase the wealth of the GUR only if its
domestic financial assets, which are mainly sav-
ings, are converted at a higher rate than its
domestic liabilities.
In a closed economy, even this asymmetric
conversion would have no aggregate effect on
the economy’s wealth; the gap between assets
and liabilities in the consolidated banking
system would have to be filled by government
“An analysis ofthe Deutsches Institut fuer Wirtschaft-
sforschung comes to the result that private households
can compensate the price effect by reducing theircon-
sumption of foods by 10 percent.
47See, for instance, Poole (1990).
“It is assumed that a procedure for an equitable distribution
ofseignorage can be devised.Mechanics of the Wealth Transfer Effected
by (Imu
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sion of savings (including currency) implies a
UM 26 billion (5.3 percent) increase in the Ger-
man central government debt. The impact of
this asymmetric conversion would have been
even higher if it were not for the “Richtungs-
koeffizient” discussed previously.
Using an assumed 8 percent interest, this ad-
ditional debt will increase the German govern-
ment’s interest payments by UM 2.1 billion,
about 0.7 percent of its total expenditure. A
uniform 1UM:1M conversion of enterprise debt,
savings and currency would have produced a
UM 76 billion increase in government debt. If
this debt were borne mainly by West German
tax payers, this would have been identical to a
wealth transfer of UM 1230 from each West
German—in the form of an interest-bearing and
non-repayable IOU—and would have provided each
East German with an additional UM 4560. This
example illustrates why the 1UM:IM conversion
rate for savings was controversial in West Ger-
many after it had become evident that a iDM:IM
rate for enterprise debt was impracticable.
The set of conversion rates chosen for the Gmu
has important implications for the debt burden of
East Germany’s enterprise sector, for the wealth
transfer between both German states and for the
level of West German government debt. The
IUM:2M conversion rate for enterprise debt may
cause some financial difficulties for many GUll
firms, but it will also lay the groundwork for the
privatization of the more profitable enterprises.
This result is a necessary precondition for the
GDR’s transition to a market economy. The ceil-
ings for the 1UM:IM conversion of savings limit
the wealth transfer from West Germany to East
Germany to a relatively small amount. The same
applies to the required increase in German
government debt and its interest payments.
A (transitory) rise in the inflation rate of the
common German currency area is unlikely after
the Gmu. The post-conversion money stock in the
GUll seems to be roughly compatible with the
GUR money demand at the new UM prices.
The medium- and long-term impacts of
monetary unification on the competitiveness of
GUR firms, on unemployment and relative living
standards in East Germany, and on the wealth
transfer from the West Germans to East Germans
has been widely overestimated. The ultimate out-
come of unification will be determined by the
productivity of East German firms, the real in-
come necessary to encourage East German
workers to remain in the GUR and the actual
wage and income levels that will be achieved in
East Germany.
Monetary unification has only have a short-term
impact on the initial wages and incomes in the
GUR. Because the conversion rates are compatible
with the more pessimistic estimates of the pro-
ductivity differential between East and West Ger-
many, they do not appear to have produced the
problem of too-high initial GUll wage levels and
possible downward-stickiness of wages in the face
of some initial unemployment pressures. Whether
the prospects provided by the economic and
social community of the two states and the far-
reaching financial assistance offered to East Ger-
many by the West German government will suf-
fice to keep skilled workers in the GUR remains
open to question.
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